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THE PREDATOR ACCOUNTABILITY ACT:
EMPOWERING WOMEN IN PROSTITUTION
TO PURSUE THEIR OWN JUSTICE
In spite of the abusive conditions in their lives prostitutes are af-
forded neither the status of victim nor survivor, but are defined as
fully consenting participants in an industry that, if viewed objec-
tively, would be understood to be the commerce of sexual abuse
and inequality.'
INTRODUCTION
Olivia was sixteen when she landed her first well-paying job, at a
strip club on Rush Street in Chicago. 2 Getting paid $1000 a night just
to sell drinks and dance seemed too good to be true.3 Stripping, and
living on her own, was certainly better than living in her parents'
house, surrounded by poverty, alcoholism, and domestic violence. 4 At
home, she had been sexually abused and had seen her mother ex-
ploited in prostitution.5 In the beginning, dancing was just what the
ads in the newspaper 6 promised-a glamorous and easy way to make
a small fortune.7 The club owners had taken care of all the details,
and even got her a fake I.D. because she was underage. 8 After work-
ing as a stripper for over a year, Olivia understood that many custom-
ers were looking for more than a few drinks and a striptease; they
came for the "services" provided only in the back half of the club.9
The managers were more than complicit in the backroom prostitution.
They were consummate recruiters, slowly moving girls from the stage
to the back rooms through flattery, intimidation, and outright threats.
These methods eventually worked on Olivia like they had on other
1. Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution: Buying the Right to Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT
III: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 143, 159 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1991).
2. JODY RAPHAEL, LISTENING TO OLIVIA: VIOLENCE, POVERTY, AND PROSTITUTION 4
(2004).
3. Id. at 31.
4. Id. at 15-17.
5. Id.; see also Eloise Dunlap et al., Girls' Sexual Development in the Inner City: From Com-
pelled Childhood Sexual Contact to Sex-for-Things Exchanges, 12 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 73
(2003) (reporting an ethnographic study of inner city women exploring the pathway from child-
hood sexual abuse to prostitution).
6. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 41.
7. Id. at 53.
8. Olivia Howard, Remarks at a DePaul University College of Law Book Reading and Dis-
cussion of Listening to Olivia: Violence, Poverty, and Prostitution (Nov. 9, 2005).
9. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 52-53.
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dancers before her.10 Although she earned more money selling sexual
acts than she had stripping, the money did not salve the degradation
of prostitution." Olivia increasingly turned to alcohol and drugs as a
sort of anesthesia to help her get through the day.12 Eventually, she
found herself handling seven or eight johns13 a night, some of whom
thought burning girls with cigarettes was part of what they had pur-
chased. 14 The club managers apparently agreed, and it was under-
stood that the girls were to handle violent johns, in the most discrete
way possible, without calling for help unless absolutely necessary. 15
When Olivia's drug addiction made it impossible for her to work a
full shift, she quit and started prostituting near hotels, where the bell-
10. Id. at 56-57.
11. Id. at 76.
12. Id. at 57, 74-75. Research has shown a high prevalence of substance abuse and alcoholism
among prostituted women. See, e.g., Stephanie Church et al., Violence by Clients Towards Fe-
male Prostitutes in Different Work Settings: Questionnaire Survey, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 524 (2001)
(reporting a survey of 240 prostituted women in Scotland in which many reported use of illegal
drugs within the previous six months); Nikki Jeal & Chris Salisbury, A Health Needs Assessment
of Street-Based Prostitutes: Cross-Sectional Survey, 26 J. PUB. HEALTH 147 (2004) (discussing
interviews of seventy-one women prostituting in Bristol, United Kingdom, which revealed that
all of the women were substance abusers).
13. The use of the term "john" in this Comment refers to an individual who trades money or
other goods or services for a sexual act. See Martin A. Monto & Nick McRee, A Comparison of
the Male Customers of Female Street Prostitutes with National Samples of Men, 49 INr'L J. OF-
FENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 505 (2005) (describing characteristics of men arrested
for soliciting street prostitutes); see also CHI: COALrrION FOR THE HOMELESS, BUYING SEX: A
SURVEY OF MEN IN CHICAGO (2004), available at http://www.chicagohomeless.org/CCH%
20Study3.pdf (calling for more research on men who buy sex and strategies for decreasing the
demand for prostitution); John Lowman et al., Sexuality in the 1990's: Survey Results (1997),
http://mypage.uniserve.ca!l-owman/ (reporting results of surveys administered as part of a larger
study of men who buy sex from "street prostitutes, escorts, masseuses, and persons advertising in
the business personal sections of various local newspapers and other publications").
14. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 76-77. Olivia's experience with violence is not anomalous. In
a study of the violence experienced during prostitution on the streets of San Francisco, 82% of
respondents reported physical assault (with 55% reporting physical assault by johns) and 68%
reported rape. Melissa Farley & Howard Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 27 WOMEN & HEALTH 37, 40-41 (1998). Of those reporting rape, 48% reported being
raped more than five times, and 46% reported being raped by johns. Id.; see also Melissa Farley
et al., Prostitution in Five Countries: Violence and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 FEMINISM &
PSYCHOL. 405 (1998) (discussing comparable results in a study conducted in the United States,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Zambia). Some research suggests that indoor prostitution
may involve less physical violence by johns. See, e.g., Barbara G. Brents & Kathryn Hausbeck,
Violence and Legalized Brothel Prostitution in Nevada: Examining Safety, Risk, and Prostitution
Policy, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 270 (noting that prostitutes in legal brothels recognized
the potential for violence from every customer, but reported very low rates of actual occur-
rence). The authors suggested that stringent house rules in legalized brothels and close monitor-
ing by management create an environment in which customers know that rulebreaking would
not be tolerated. Id. at 281-82.
15. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 76.
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hops would solicit customers for her.16 On good nights, when she had
high-paying johns or could rob a john or two, she only needed to turn
a few dates.17 But working on the streets was not lucrative enough for
Olivia to keep her apartment, so she moved in with her drug dealer,
Strychnine, who quickly became her pimp.' 8 Strychnine was a big
man with a violent reputation, and having him around made Olivia
less fearful of jumping into cars with men she did not know.1 9 In the
eight years she spent with Strychnine, however, his presence only ad-
ded to the violence that she suffered. 20 Not only was Olivia routinely
beaten and raped by johns, she was also abused physically, sexually,
and emotionally by Strychnine, her avowed protector. 21 When Olivia
left prostitution, nineteen years after being hired at the strip club, she
had been arrested sixty-two times for prostitution-related offenses, 22
her ribs had been broken at least twelve times, 23 and she had been
admitted to hospital emergency rooms on countless occasions for inju-
ries inflicted by johns or her pimp.24
Now, more than twenty years after her escape from prostitution,
Olivia is a college graduate who puts her experiences to work as a
director at a major drug treatment program in Chicago. 25 Though two
decades have passed, she continues to suffer from a number of medi-
cal problems she believes were caused by the violence and stress of
prostitution, including recurrent headaches and ulcers. 26 Meanwhile,
those who inflicted her injuries are likely oblivious or indifferent to
16. Id. at 92.
17. Id.
18. Id. Research on the link between homelessness (or near homelessness) and prostitution is
sparse. See CHI. COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, UNLOCKING OPTIONS FOR WOMEN: A SUR-
VEY OF WOMEN IN COOK COUNTY JAIL (2002), available at http://www.chicagohomeless.org/fact-
sfigures/jailstudy.pdf (detailing a survey of 235 women in the Cook County Jail in 2003 in which
54% of respondents indicated they had experienced homelessness "in the 30 days prior to enter-
ing jail").
19. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 92-93.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 93.
22. Id. at 129.
23. Id. at 145.
24. Howard, supra note 8.
25. Email from Jody Raphael, Senior Research Fellow, DePaul University College of Law, to
the author (Jan. 24, 2006, 14:39 CST) (on file with author).
26. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 232. Research exploring the harms of prostitution has focused
primarily on transmission of sexually transmitted infections (STIs), to the exclusion of other
physical illnesses and psychological harms. Farley & Barkan, supra note 14, at 46. In Farley's
study of street prostitution in San Francisco, 75% of respondents reported drug and alcohol
abuse, 68% met the clinical criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder, and 50% reported some
physical health problem. Id. at 45-46.
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the harm they have caused.27 Some of them are "substantial citizens
such as lawyers and judges, politicians, priests and deacons, law en-
forcement officers, and high-ranking military personnel"; they are "re-
spectable men who [have] much to lose by public exposure. ' 28 Do the
men that bought and sold Olivia owe her anything? Should they be
held accountable for the myriad health problems that she endures
twenty years later? Or should society continue to ignore the role
these men play in the continuation of the sex trade industry, subscrib-
ing to the fiction that buying and selling women's bodies is "normal
and natural"? 29
This Comment explores one possibility for shifting some responsi-
bility to the johns and pimps who keep the machinery of the sex trade
industry running: a civil cause of action for those used in prostitu-
tion.30 To date, four states have created some version of this cause of
action, including Illinois.31 Part II of this Comment provides a brief
overview of federal and state causes of action available to prostituted
women, 32 including the Illinois Predator Accountability Act (PAA),
and examines one case brought under a similar Florida statute.33 Part
III discusses weaknesses in the state causes of action enacted prior to
the Illinois statute and explores how the PAA remedies some of these
27. See generally DaNa Mueller, Curbing the Demand for Prostitution, FACTS BEHIND THE
FACES (Chi. Coalition for the Homeless, Chi., Ill.), Fall 2005, available at http://www.chi-
cagohomeless.org/factsfigures/PolicyPaper%20Fal105.pdf (summarizing several strategies for re-
ducing prostitution by decreasing demand, including shaming techniques whereby pictures of
those arrested for solicitation are posted online). One criticism of the shaming technique is that
it unfairly targets minority and lower income johns, as arrests are generally the result of street
prostitution sting setups in economically depressed areas. It is possible that more affluent johns
are more discreet-using massage parlors and personal ads, or picking up women on the street in
neighborhoods not targeted by the police.
28. REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, reprinted
in 42 FLA. L. REV. 803, 899 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting P. Levine, Prosti-
tution in Florida, A Report to the Gender Bias Study Commission of the Supreme Court of
Florida 17 (Sept. 1988) (unpublished manuscript)) [hereinafter FLORIDA REPORT]; accord Mar-
tin A. Monto, Prostitution and Fellatio, 38 J. SEX RES. 140, 141 (2001) (providing statistical infor-
mation on the educational backgrounds of johns arrested in San Francisco, Portland, and Las
Vegas).
29. Stephen Grubman-Black, Deconstructing John, in DEMAND DYNAMICS: THE FORCES OF
DEMAND IN GLOBAL SEX TRAFFICKING: CONFERENCE REPORT 17, 19 (2004).
30. This Comment uses feminine pronouns to refer to likely plaintiffs in cases brought under
this type of cause of action and masculine pronouns for likely defendants.
31. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663J (LexisNexis
2002); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.80 (West
2003).
32. Phrases like "prostituted women" are used throughout this Comment in lieu of the much
simpler and less awkward "prostitute," out of respect for those who have been victimized by
prostitution.
33. See infra notes 37-95 and accompanying text.
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weaknesses. 34 Part IV examines the likely impact of the PAA and
compares its usefulness with criminal prosecution.35 Finally, Part V
concludes that, though the PAA provides a way for some prostituted
women to obtain a measure of justice, it cannot supplant equitable
application of criminal prostitution laws against the demand side of
the industry.36
II. BACKGROUND
This Part provides an overview of past and existing civil causes of
action available to prostituted individuals against pimps or johns. It
reviews the federal Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 37 which
targeted gender-based violence in general, as well as innovative state
initiatives passed in Florida, Hawaii, and Minnesota for use by prosti-
tuted women.38 This Part also discusses a case brought under the
Florida statute. 39
A. Overview of the Federal Violence
Against Women Act
Congress passed the VAWA in 1994, creating a civil cause of action
for victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence such as sexual as-
sault. 40 Whether an activity constituted a "crime of violence" de-
pended, in part, on whether it was considered a felony under federal
or state law. 41 In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court invali-
dated the civil cause of action created by the VAWA, holding that
34. See infra notes 96-179 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 180-196 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
There are other ways for prostituted individuals with creative lawyers to pursue civil actions in
federal court against those who victimized them. See, e.g., Lan Cao, Note, Illegal Traffic in
Women: A Civil RICO Proposal, 96 YALE L.J. 1297 (1987) (discussing how trafficked women
might use the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as a basis for litigation).
38. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663J (LexisNexis
2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.80 (West 2003).
39. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
40. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) ("A
person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives
another of the right [to be free of crimes of violence as] declared in subsection (b) of this section
shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate.")).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d). In full, the VAWA defined "crime of violence motivated by gender"
as "a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least
in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." Id. "Crime of violence" was defined as
follows:
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Congress had no .authority "to provide a federal civil remedy ...
under the Commerce Clause [or] under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'42 Before the Court's decision in Morrison, there was only one
reported civil suit against a solicitor, panderer, or john by a prosti-
tuted woman under the provisions of the VAWA. 43 One obstacle to
such claims may have been the required showing of case-specific "ani-
mus" based on gender, which was difficult to construe and even more
difficult to satisfy.44 Making such a showing was a challenge even in
rape and sexual assault cases, due to "traditional gender biases, rape
myths and sexual stereotypes. ' '45 Demonstrating gender animus
would have been even more troublesome in prostitution-related cases,
given society's tendency to view prostituted women as consenting
adults.46
B. Overview of Civil Causes of Action Currently
Available at the State Level
After Morrison, at least two states took to heart the Court's state-
ment that the Constitution gives state governments the power to po-
lice "truly local" affairs, particularly "suppression of violent crime and
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that
would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of phys-
ical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal
offenses described in section 16 of title 18 [which provides an alternate definition for
"crime of violence," centered on the use, attempted use, or threat of physical force],
whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or
conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, terri-
torial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and (B) includes an act or series of
acts that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relation-
ship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such
action is taken.
Id. The requirement that the underlying crime be a felony was an additional difficulty in bring-
ing prostitution-related civil suits under the VAWA, particularly those in which the underlying
act does not constitute a federal felony and where there was no threatened, attempted, or actual
use of physical force. In many states, soliciting, pandering, pimping, and hiring prostitutes con-
stitute misdemeanor offenses, so claims based on these activities would fall short of the "felony
crime" requirement of the VAWA. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-18 (West 2002).
42. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
43. Balas v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). This case also included a claim
under the civil cause of action that exists in Florida for prostituted individuals against their
pimps. See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1); accord J. Rebekka S. Bonner, Note, Reconceptualizing VAWA's
"Animus" for Rape in States' Emerging Post-VAWA Civil Rights Legislation, 111 YALE L.J. 1417
(2002) (discussing the conceptualization of "animus" in post-VAWA civil rights statutes cropping
up in states).
45. Jeanne A. Soriana, Comment, Prostitution: An Economic Activity Entitled to a Federal
Civil Remedy Under the Commerce Clause, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 207, 217 (2002).
46. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 896-97.
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vindication of its victims. '47 Both California 48 and Illinois49 passed
statutes that resemble the civil remedies overturned in Morrison, and
there has been some movement in other states to do the same.50 Al-
though these statutes have not yet been utilized by women victimized
in the sex trade industry, the statutory language is likely broad enough
to allow recovery in such cases.51 Other statutes, even before Morri-
son, went further and addressed prostitution specifically.
1. Florida
In 1987, Florida Chief Justice Parker Lee created the Supreme
Court Gender Bias Study Commission "to determine in what areas of
our legal society bias based on gender exists, and recommend mea-
sures to correct, or at least minimize the effect of, any such bias."'52
The Commission used a multidisciplinary approach, collecting infor-
mation at public hearings and regional meetings, examining arrest and
sentencing patterns, and conducting surveys of the Florida legal com-
munity at all levels, from law school students to judges.5 3 In the area
of "Gender Bias in Criminal Justice," the Commission found that
women who became part of the Florida legal system tended to be
"treated more harshly than similarly situated male offenders. ' 54 It
found that enforcement of prostitution laws was one of the worst in-
stances of this inequity:
The laws against prostitution are enforced primarily against women,
not the men who coerce them into prostitution or the customers
who use their "services." .. . [P]rostitution is not a victimless crime.
Its victims are the girls who run away from abusive and incestuous
47. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.4 (West 2006).
49. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/10 (WEST Supp. 2007).
50. See Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act:
Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157 (2005) (discussing state and local laws similar
to the VAWA).
51. Both laws include multiple definitions of "gender-related violence," including "[a] physi-
cal intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions," although the
Illinois law also requires that the violence meet the Illinois statutory definition of battery. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 52.4(c)(2); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 82/5(2). The broad language of the state
statutes notwithstanding, recovery for prostitution-related injuries remains more likely when
suits are brought under laws tailored to the idiosyncrasies of the sex trade industry. Further,
filing a civil suit under a law not specifically designed for use by prostituted women might raise
other obstacles, because many courts would decline to hear cases that arise from illegal conduct.
See Ben Fischer, House Panel Votes to Let Prostitutes Sue Pimps, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005,
at 10 (quoting Samir Goswami of the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, an organization that
lobbied for the bill).
52. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 803 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. Id. at 803-04.
54. Id. at 837.
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relationships at home and are treated by the legal system first as
errant children and later as hardened criminals.
The Commission concludes that the dimensions of the problem
are staggering and, by comparison, the legal system's efforts to com-
bat prostitution have been futile at best.55
The Commission also specifically found that prostituted women are
likely to be "controlled by 'pimps' who use a variety of coercive meth-
ods," and that women often engage in prostitution as a means to sur-
vive rather than by choice. 56 When arrested, these women face a
judicial system that does not recognize that pimps and johns are more
culpable than prostituted women, and does not provide effective
treatment and rehabilitation.57 The Commission recommended that
Florida respond to these systemic problems in several ways, including
"creat[ing] a civil cause of action on behalf of women against their
pimps. "58
On May 15, 1993, Florida became the first state in the country to
provide prostituted women with a civil cause of action outside of
traditional tort actions. 59 Although the Florida statute does not per-
mit plaintiffs to sue johns or attempted johns, plaintiffs may bring suit
against those who coerced them to begin prostituting, stay in prostitu-
tion, or relinquish any portion of prostitution-related earnings.60 The
statute defines coercion as "any practice of domination, restraint, or
inducement for the purpose of or with the reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect of causing another person to engage in or remain in prostitution
or to relinquish earnings derived from prostitution," and it lists several
specific examples. 61 Defendants are barred from raising certain de-
55. Id. at xxxvii.
56. Id. at xxxviii.
57. Id.
58. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at xl.
59. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 91-32 (West) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 2005)).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09(1).
61. Id. § 796.09(3). This section of the statute reads as follows:
(3) As used in this section, the term "coercion" means any practice of domination,
restraint, or inducement for the purpose of or with the reasonably foreseeable effect of
causing another person to engage in or remain in prostitution or to relinquish earnings
derived from prostitution, and includes, but is not limited to: (a) Physical force or
threats of physical force. (b) Physical or mental torture. (c) Kidnapping. (d) Black-
mail. (e) Extortion or claims of indebtedness. (f) Threat of legal complaint or report of
delinquency. (g) Threat to interfere with parental rights or responsibilities, whether by
judicial or administrative action or otherwise. (h) Promise of legal benefit. (i) Promise
of greater financial rewards. (j) Promise of marriage. (k) Restraint of speech or com-
munication with others. (1) Exploitation of a condition of developmental disability,
cognitive limitation, affective disorder, or substance dependency. (in) Exploitation of
victimization by sexual abuse. (n) Exploitation of pornographic performance. (o) Ex-
ploitation of human needs for food, shelter, safety, or affection.
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fenses, including that the plaintiff received remuneration for the pros-
titution (the "compensation" defense) and that the plaintiff was
prostituted prior to involvement with the defendant (the "preexisting
practice" defense). 62 Suits are governed by Florida's four-year statute
of limitations for personal injury tort actions. 63 The statute is tolled if
the injured party was a minor at the time of the injury and the injury
constitutes "abuse" under Florida law.64 When the statute is tolled,
the injured party must bring suit within seven years of turning eigh-
teen, within four years of gaining independence from a defendant who
is a parent or guardian, or within four years of the date the injured
party realized the harm and understood that it was caused by the de-
fendant.65 Plaintiffs receive derivative immunity from future criminal
investigations or proceedings, except for charges of perjury.66 If suc-
cessful, they may recover not only compensatory and punitive dam-
ages but also, at the court's discretion, attorney's fees and litigation
costs.
6 7
Since it was enacted more than twelve years ago, only two claims
brought under the Florida statute have been reported. 68 In Balas v.
Ruzzo, two female plaintiffs sued the owner and manager of a "leisure
spa," alleging that she manipulated and coerced them into selling sex-
ual acts.69 The plaintiffs brought claims of assault, battery, false im-
prisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as
Id.; accord Margaret A. Baldwin, Strategies of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Politics, 1
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 65, 71 (1993) (explaining that the Florida statute begins with the common
forms of compulsion used in prostitution and rape).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09(5) ("(5) It does not constitute a defense to a complaint under
this section that: (a) The plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated for acts of prostitution; (b)
The plaintiff engaged in acts of prostitution prior to any involvement with the defendant; or (3)
The plaintiff made no attempt to escape, flee, or otherwise terminate contact with the
defendant.").
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(o) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006).
64. Id. § 95.11(7).
65. Id.
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09(4).
67. Id. § 769.09(1), (7).
68. Bryan v. Bryan, 930 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Balas v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). As of November 14, 2006, internet database searches do not disclose
any cases other than those mentioned above. There are, however, a number of pleadings citing
the statute available on Westlaw, demonstrating that plaintiffs are bringing claims under the
Florida statute. The limited number of reported cases may be because of the limited reporting of
lower court decisions and the willingness of defendants to settle, rather than defend themselves
in a public setting or face trial. See generally Margaret Baldwin, What Can Be Done to Interfere
with and Ultimately Eliminate Demand?, in DEMAND DYNAMICS, supra note 29, at 105 (explor-
ing the link between johns' ability to stay anonymous, the judicial system's failure to hold johns
accountable, and the disparate assignment of culpability to the women).
69. Balas, 703 So. 2d at 1076-77.
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a claim under the Florida statute. 70 During discovery, the defense
sought information that would demonstrate that the plaintiffs were
prostitutes prior to their employment at the defendant's establish-
ment, that they prostituted themselves outside of the defendant's es-
tablishment during the same time period, and that they continued to
prostitute themselves after leaving the defendant's employ. 71 On ap-
peal, the court found that the information and materials requested
were discoverable because the plaintiffs had brought suit under
§ 796.09 in combination with other causes of action, effectively elimi-
nating the protection against the preexisting practice defense. 72
2. Minnesota
On May 10, 1994, Minnesota became the second state to create a
civil cause of action for prostituted individuals against those who co-
erced them to join or remain in prostitution.73 This legislation came
as a result of lobbying by Women Hurt In Systems of Prostitution En-
gaged in Revolt (WHISPER), an advocacy group comprised of law
students, professors, and prostitution survivors.74 In 1992, WHISPER
launched a campaign to formulate public policy initiatives, outside of
legalization and decriminalization, to combat the injurious effects of
prostitution. 75 As a result of that campaign, WHISPER's ad hoc
group pushed the Minnesota legislature to follow Florida in creating a
civil cause of action for prostituted women. 76 The group selected this
particular legislative initiative because of its goals:
First, the legislation had to directly impact the ability of individuals
to profit from the coercion of women and youth into or to remain in
prostitution for their profit. Second, the bill had to impede the abil-
ity of johns to purchase sex at the expense of prostituted women
with little, if any, risk to themselves. Third, the legislation had to
provide immediate relief and benefits to women harmed in
prostitution.77
Despite several changes to the bill, 78 the resulting Minnesota law is
a somewhat broader cause of action than that created in Florida. The
70. Id. at 1077.
71. Id. at 1077-78.
72. Id. at 1079.
73. 1994 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 624 (West) (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.81 (West
2003)).
74. Evelina Giobbe & Sue Gibel, Impressions of a Public Policy Initiative, 16 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & PoL'Y 1, 2 (1994).
75. Id. at 16-17.
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 30-31.
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Minnesota law includes pimps and panderers as proper defendants
but, unlike Florida's law, also allows for actions against some johns,
attempted johns, and prostitution business owners.79 In addition, the
Minnesota statute includes a more extensive list of specific "coercive"
behaviors than the Florida model, including destruction of property,
interfering with educational opportunities, and creating an employ-
ment environment that foreseeably leads to prostitution.80 As a result
of amendments made by the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee,
however, these enumerated behaviors only constitute evidence of co-
ercion, rather than coercion per se, thus increasing the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof.81 Finally, the Minnesota statute specifically excludes a
number of affirmative defenses, including consent, prohibition of
prostitution by an employment contract or posted notices (the "em-
ployer prohibition" defense), and initiation of the relationship with
the defendant by the plaintiff (the "plaintiff initiation" defense). 82 To
date, no cases brought under the Minnesota law have been reported.
79. Id.
80. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.80 subd. 2 (West 2003) (defining "coercion" as the use or threat
of "any form of domination, restraint, or control for the purpose of causing an individual to
engage in or remain in prostitution or to relinquish earnings derived from prostitution"). The
statute addresses coercion comprehensively:
Coercion exists if the totality of the circumstances establish the existence of domina-
tion, restraint, or control that would have the reasonably foreseeable effect of causing
an individual to engage in or remain in prostitution or to relinquish earnings derived
from prostitution. Evidence of coercion may include, but is not limited to: (1) physical
force or actual or implied threats of physical force; (2) physical or mental torture; (3)
implicitly or explicitly leading an individual to believe that the individual will be pro-
tected from violence or arrest; (4) kidnapping; (5) defining the terms of an individual's
employment or working conditions in a manner that can foreseeably lead to the indi-
vidual's use in prostitution; (6) blackmail; (7) extortion or claims of indebtedness; (8)
threat of legal complaint or report of delinquency; (9) threat to interfere with parental
rights or responsibilities, whether by judicial or administrative action or otherwise; (10)
promise of legal benefit, such as posting bail, procuring an attorney, protecting from
arrest, or promising unionization; (11) promise of financial rewards; (12) promise of
marriage; (13) restraining speech or communication with others, such as exploiting a
language difference, or interfering with the use of mail, telephone, or money; (14) iso-
lating an individual from others; (15) exploiting a condition of developmental disability,
cognitive limitation, affective disorder, or substance dependency; (16) taking advantage
of lack of intervention by child protection; (17) exploiting victimization by previous
sexual abuse or battering; (18) exploiting pornographic performance; (19) interfering
with opportunities for education or skills training; (20) destroying property; (21) re-
straining movement; (22) exploiting HIV status, particularly where the defendant's pre-
vious coercion led to the HIV exposure; or (23) exploiting needs for food, shelter,
safety, affection, or intimate or marital relationships.
Id.
81. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 41-42, 51.
82. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.82; Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 31-32.
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3. Hawaii
At the end of 1999, Hawaii joined Florida and Minnesota in creat-
ing a similar cause of action against pimps, panderers, johns, and at-
tempted johns.8 3 Like the Minnesota law, Hawaii's statute provides a
nonexhaustive list of behaviors that constitute evidence of coercion. 84
Though the two lists are similar, Hawaii's law identifies several behav-
iors that constitute evidence of coercion only where the plaintiff was a
minor.85 For example, evidence that a defendant exploited the plain-
tiff's need for food and shelter or provided "financial rewards" would
not be admissible to show coercion if the plaintiff was eighteen or
older at the time.86 Evidence that a defendant defined "terms of an
individual's employment or working conditions in a manner that [was]
likely to lead to the individual's use in prostitution" is similarly inad-
missible unless the plaintiff was a minor.87 A more significant differ-
ence between the Hawaii statute and those in Florida and Minnesota
is that the Hawaii law does not enumerate nondefenses. Finally, the
Hawaii law contains a two-year statute of limitations, tolled only while
plaintiffs are minors or while criminal prosecution against the defen-
dant is pending. 88
C. The Illinois Predator Accountability Act
The Illinois legislature began consideration of the PAA in early
2005 and passed a final version of the bill in April 2006.89 On July 3,
2006, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich signed the bill into law,
thereby enabling prostituted individuals to sue a number of individu-
als involved in prostitution-from johns and would-be johns to pimps,
panderers, solicitors, and recruiters.90 Unlike its predecessors in Flor-
ida, Minnesota, and Hawaii, the Illinois statute does not require the
83. 1999 Haw. Sess. Laws 203 (codified at HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663J-3 (LexisNexis
2002)).
84. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663J-4.
85. Id. § 663J-4(15).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 663J-7.
89. 2006 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2327 (West).
90. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128 (West Supp. 2007). The relevant part of the statute pro-
vides as follows:
(b) A victim of the sex trade has a cause of action against a person or entity who: (1)
recruits, profits from, or maintains the victim in any sex trade act; (2) intentionally
abuses, as defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, or
causes bodily harm, as defined in Section 12-12 of the Criminal Code of 1961, to the
victim in any sex trade act; or (3) knowingly advertises or publishes advertisements for
the purposes of recruitment into sex trade activity.
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plaintiff to prove coercion as an element of the claim, and it does not
enumerate coercive behaviors. 91 Like its counterparts, the Illinois leg-
islation specifies a number of so-called nondefenses.92 The list is more
comprehensive than those in the other state statutes, excluding not
only obvious defenses like consent, but also less intuitive defenses
based on the plaintiff and defendant's sexual involvement, cohabita-
tion, or marriage.93 Finally, the Illinois statute of limitations allows
prostituted individuals to sue up to ten years after "the date the plain-
tiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should dis-
cover both (i) that the sex trade act occurred, and (ii) that the
defendant caused, was responsible for, or profited from the sex trade
act."94 The limitations period is tolled in specified situations. 95
III. THE ILLINOIS PREDATOR ACCOUNTABILITY
AcT IN CONTEXT
This Part provides an in-depth examination of a number of differ-
ences between the Illinois statute and those passed in Florida, Hawaii,
and Minnesota.96 The critical differences include the elimination of
Id. § 128/15. An earlier version of the bill would have created an additional cause of action for
individuals who are retaliated against after suing under the law, but this provision was removed
from the final version. H.B. 1299, 94th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2005).
91. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/15.
92. Id. § 128/25. The bill addresses nondefenses thoroughly:
(a) It is not a defense to an action brought under this Act that: (1) the victim of the sex
trade and the defendant had a marital or consenting sexual relationship; (2) the defen-
dant is related to the victim of the sex trade by blood or marriage, or has lived with the
defendant in any formal or informal household arrangement; (3) the victim of the sex
trade was paid or otherwise compensated for sex trade activity; (4) the victim of the sex
trade engaged in sex trade activity prior to any involvement with the defendant; (5) the
victim of the sex trade made no attempt to escape, flee, or otherwise terminate contact
with the defendant; (6) the victim of the sex trade consented to engage in acts of the sex
trade; (7) it was a single incident of activity; or (8) there was no physical contact in-
volved. (b) Any illegality of the sex trade activity on the part of the victim of the sex
trade shall not be an affirmative defense to any action brought under this Act.
Id.
93. Id.
94. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-225(b) (West Supp. 2007).
95. Id. § 13-225(c)-(f). The statute provides for tolling in four situations: in some cases where
the plaintiff was subjected to a "continuing series of sex trade acts by the same defendant";
where the plaintiff is a minor or has some other legal disability at the time the sex trade act
occurs; where the plaintiff is subject to "threats, intimidation, manipulation, or fraud perpetrated
by the defendant or by any person acting in the interest of the defendant"; and, finally, during
the length of limitations periods for criminal laws under which the plaintiff may be prosecuted.
Id. In addition, a prior version of the bill would have placed no limitations period on actions
seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief. H.B. 1299, 94th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2005).
96. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 2000); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663J (LexisNexis
2002); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128 (West Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.80 (West
2003).
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coercion as an element of the claim, the strengthening of the bar
against certain defenses, and the relatively long statute of limitations.
Although earlier versions of the statute were even stronger than the
final product, the PAA is substantially broader than anything previ-
ously passed.
A. Coercion Inheres in the Sex Trade
The first and most significant difference between the PAA and simi-
lar causes of action in other states is that plaintiffs bringing suit in
Illinois are not required to prove coercion. 97 The drafters of the Illi-
nois law considered this departure essential to ensure that the legisla-
tion would be effective, given the unusual difficulties in bringing these
types of claims.98 One commentator discussed some of these
difficulties:
Most of the violence of prostitution occurs in private .... [T]he vio-
lent acts of the abusers are rarely documented, either through police
or medical reports. Generally few people witness the acts of vio-
lence between pimps and johns, and prostituted women. If anyone
does witness this abuse, they are likely to be other pimps and johns,
who may be equally culpable, or other prostituted women, who face
the same risks and credibility problems as the plaintiff herself.
Even when these problems do not exist, the plaintiff must be able to
locate these witnesses, probably years after the incident occurred,
and they must be willing to testify. 99
As structured, the Illinois statute eliminates the requirement of mak-
ing the difficult showing of coercion, possibly many years after the
fact. It recognizes that coercion inheres in prostitution and that "all
who become prostitutes are coerced." 100
B. Johns and Business Establishments with Sex
Trade Ties Are Proper Defendants
One of the most notable deficiencies in the Florida statute is the
exclusion of johns and attempted johns as defendants. 101 This exclu-
sion limits the options of those who have been injured, gives johns
"the greatest legal and social protections of all, even though they are
the raison d'etre of the entire institution... [and] strongly supports an
97. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/15.
98. Interview with Samir Goswami, Assoc. Dir. of Policy, Chi. Coalition for the Homeless, in
Chi., 11. (Oct. 4, 2005).
99. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 51. This is not to imply that prostituted women are
coerced only through violence. Coercion in the context of prostitution is much more diverse, as
suggested by the per se coercive behaviors included in the various state statutes.
100. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 896.
101. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09(1).
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inference that [a] gender-biased application of the law has the blessing
... of the state.1102 The drafters of the Minnesota statute attempted
to avoid this weakness by making it possible to sue johns and at-
tempted johns who "[knew] or [had] reason to believe that the indi-
vidual was coerced into or coerced to remain in prostitution.' 1 3 The
Conference Committee appended the phrase "by another person,"
implying that johns are not involved in the coercion of prostituted
women "and are ordinarily unaware that [these women] have been
coerced by a third party." 1°4 A second amendment, specifically ex-
cluding monetary payments by johns as evidence of coercion, was
equally detrimental because it allowed "the legislature to ignore the
central role of johns in the instigation and continuation of prostitu-
tion" and guaranteed "unconditional sexual access to women's bod-
ies" based on the traditional notion that "you cannot steal (rape) what
you have just purchased (a prostitute). ''0 5
The Hawaii statute similarly allowed actions against johns and at-
tempted johns only if they should have known that someone else co-
erced the plaintiff into prostitution.10 6 It is arguable that offering
money for sex is itself coercive, but the incorporation of the "reasona-
ble person" standard goes against everything these statutes are meant
to accomplish. Enumerating behaviors that constitute per se coercion
is a method of removing from the factfinder the ability to decide when
an individual has been prostituted against her will.10 7 Removing this
issue from the factfinder is essential, because society as a whole "does
not understand, or acknowledge, the process of coercion that under-
lies prostitution." 10 8 Because a "reasonable person" may not believe
that those who sell sex have been coerced, johns and attempted johns
are unlikely to be liable under Hawaii's statute, despite being proper
defendants.
Although lacking the restrictions of other state statutes, the Illinois
law places conditions on john liability that may be similarly con-
straining. In most suits seeking damages from johns, the plaintiff will
be "the prostitute who [was] the object of the solicitation."' 1 9 Johns,
however, do not become liable merely by soliciting this individual;
102. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 900.
103. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 58.
104. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted).
105. Id. at 38-40; accord MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.80 (West 2003).
106. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663J-3(4) (LexisNexis 2002).
107. See Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 41-42 (discussing changes to the Minnesota law
that had the effect of increasing the plaintiff's burden of proving coercion).
108. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 897.
109. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/10 (West Supp. 2007).
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they must "intentionally abuse" or "cause[ ] bodily harm" to the pros-
tituted individual in order to incur liability.110 It seems unlikely that
courts will find that johns "abuse" or "cause bodily harm" to prosti-
tuted women just by committing a sexual act. It is more likely that
suits under the statute will be successful only against those johns who
were violent or impregnated the plaintiff.11'
What is clear in the PAA is that pimps, panderers, and solicitors are
liable to those whom they prostitute." 2 Further, it has a broader
reach than other statutes because it imposes liability on businesses
that knowingly advertise or publish advertisements to recruit women
into the sex trade.1 13 This provision increases the likelihood that pros-
tituted individuals will prevail." 4 First, such businesses (or their own-
ers) are more likely targets because they are more easily located for
service of process.1 15 Second, and more importantly, strip clubs and
massage parlors tend to have deeper pockets than street pimps. This
110. Id. § 128/15(b)(2). Abuse includes "physical abuse, harassment, intimidation of a depen-
dent, interference with personal liberty or willful deprivation." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/
103(1) (West Supp. 2006). Bodily harm is defined as "physical harm" and includes "sexually
transmitted disease, pregnancy and impotence." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-12 (West
2002). One result of writing the statute in this way is that liability against would-be johns is very
constrained. A person who unsuccessfully attempted to hire a prostituted woman would have to
resort to some sort of physical abuse or harassment to become liable.
111. Of course, unlike in Minnesota and Hawaii, in cases where an Illinois john were found to
be otherwise liable, he would not be able to defend himself on grounds that he did not know that
the victim was coerced, since coercion is not an element of the offense. See supra notes 97-100
and accompanying text.
112. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/15(b)(1). The statute creates liability for anyone who
"recruits, profits from, or maintains the victim in the sex trade." Id.
113. Id. § 128/15(b)(3). The statute includes a caveat to this provision:
This Section shall not be construed to create liability to any person or entity who pro-
vides goods or services to the general public, who also provides those goods or services
to persons who would be liable under subsection (b) of this Section, absent a showing
that the person or entity either: (1) knowingly markets or provides its goods or services
primarily to persons or entities liable under subsection (b) of this Section; (2) know-
ingly receives a higher level of compensation from persons or entities liable under sub-
section (b) of this Section than it generally receives from customers; or (3) supervises or
exercises control over persons or entities liable under subsection (b) of this Section.
Id. § 12 8 /15(c).
114. Id. § 128/15(b)(3); see also RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 41-43 (discussing the advertising
strategies used by the sex trade industry). In one Chicago-area example cited by Raphael, a strip
club advertised itself as a no-nudity strip club on radio, despite being listed in an online directory
as a nude club with an upstairs VIP room where physical contact is possible. Id. In many cases,
the advertisements are openly published in local newspapers or announced on radio stations that
cater to teenagers or young adults. Id.
115. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 41-43. When the businesses are still operating and running
advertisements with current contact information, serving them with process is certainly less diffi-
cult than tracking down a pimp whose nickname may be all that is known to the plaintiff. For
the same reasons, finding the former owners of such businesses several years later is likely to be
less difficult than tracking down individual pimps.
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makes them attractive to plaintiffs who stand to recover punitive dam-
ages, litigation costs, and attorney's fees, in addition to compensatory
damages. 116 For women like Olivia, lured into prostitution and drugs
by club owners and businessmen who target the naive and inexperi-
enced, this provision is more than potentially lucrative; it allows them
to hold accountable those businesses that pull girls from disadvan-
taged lives into a world of degradation and violence. 17
C. The PAA Unequivocally Bars a Comprehensive
List of Defenses
The extensive list of nondefenses is another provision of the Illinois
law that makes it more useful than the statutes passed in Florida, Ha-
waii, and Minnesota. 118 Excluding these defenses as a matter of law is
important if the PAA is to be of use to prospective plaintiffs, given the
pervasive societal bias against prostituted women. 19
1. Florida
The Florida statute is unnecessarily narrow and useful to only a
small number of prostituted women in Florida.120 The statute's con-
strained list of nondefenses allows a defense of consent, plaintiff initi-
ation, or that the plaintiff engaged in prostitution after her
involvement with the defendant (the "continuing practice" de-
fense).' 21 The Florida statute also allows the employer prohibition de-
fense in cases of indoor prostitution. As a result, a defendant in
Florida has a wealth of defenses available.
The most likely defense, however, is consent. l22 The failure to pre-
clude consent as a defense effectively ensures that perceptions of
prostitution as "victimless" will influence the outcomes of cases tried
116. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/20.
117. See RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 34-35 (explaining the prevalence of very young girls in
prostitution and arguing that the younger a girl is when she is first prostituted, the less likely she
is to exit the industry, even many years later). On a related note, prostituted individuals have
only a very limited ability to sue businesses that actually carry or sell the advertisements. The
statute stipulates that such businesses are liable only if they knowingly publish advertisements
intended to recruit individuals into prostitution. Accordingly, radio stations, newspapers, and
magazines that run ads for jobs at near-nude, "no touching" clubs would not incur liability unless
they knew before publication that the purpose of the advertisements was to recruit individuals
for prostitution.
118. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/25.
119. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.09 (West 2000).
121. Id. § 796.09(5).
122. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 18 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing why consent serves to negate any alleged injury).
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under the Florida statute. 123 Margaret Baldwin, the drafter of the
Florida statute, intended for it to embody an understanding that con-
sent to prostitution is rarely, if ever, voluntary. 124 Baldwin noted that
"sexual 'bargains' which exploit women's isolation, deprivation, and
despair... are conditions under which many girls and women stay in
prostitution. ' 125 The statute's list of enumerated coercive behaviors
"affirm simply that women and girls are not available for prostitution,
and do not consent to it, by the fact of being human, with real needs,
real vulnerabilities, and real wounds. ' 126 But the statutory language
allows Florida courts to accept consent as a valid defense, particularly
when none of the enumerated coercive behaviors are present, and
perhaps even when they are. 127 This undermines the purpose of the
statute, since the Florida report that spurred the passing of the law
found unequivocally that prostitution is rarely voluntary and is usually
the result of coercion.1 28
That Florida judges may interpret the statute in this way is demon-
strated by Judge Charles Harris's concurring opinion in Balas.129
Judge Harris argued that the Florida legislature did not intend to pro-
vide a "general prostitute's relief act.' 130 He rejected the argument
that the meaning of "coercion" should be drawn from the plain lan-
guage of the statute, despite its definition of "coercion" and its four-
teen enumerated examples. 131 He reasoned that if the plaintiffs made
"a reasoned and voluntary exercise of their free will to enter or con-
tinue in the profession solely for financial rewards," then coercion was
not present, and no cause of action would lie.132
Judge Harris's interpretation of "coercion" is problematic because
it embodies the traditional prejudice against prostituted women-the
same prejudice that spurred the Florida Commission to recommend
123. See Baldwin, supra note 61, at 70-71 (indicating that the Florida bill was intended by its
sponsor to create a cause of action for use in cases of "'nonconsensual' prostitution" and that the
enumerated coercive behaviors in the bill were included to delineate circumstances under which
the victim's consent is ineffective).
124. Id. at 72.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
128. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 906.
129. Balas v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076, 1079-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Harris, J.,
concurring).
130. Id. at 1082 (arguing that the legislature did not intend "to depart from the precepts of the
commonly understood meaning of 'coercion' and to redefine it to include both free will decisions
and compelled decisions").
131. Id. at 1081-82.
132. Id. at 1082.
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creating this cause of action.' 33 Similarly problematic is that Judge
Harris's interpretation imposes a much stricter test for coercion than
required by the plain language of the statute, effectively frustrating
the efforts of the Florida legislature to address the reality of prostitu-
tion. 34 If Florida courts are willing to define "coercion" according to
its dictionary definition and against the language of the statute, the
availability of this cause of action will be limited to the point of irrele-
vance.135 Potential plaintiffs would be limited to three categories of
individuals: (1) those physically forced to prostitute themselves, (2)
those who prostituted themselves due to credible threats of physical
force against themselves or others, and (3) those who were prostituted
due to a physical or mental disability or involuntary intoxication. 36
This limited group of plaintiffs would already have the gamut of tradi-
tional tort actions available to them, including intentional infliction of
emotional distress, false imprisonment, sexual assault, and battery.
They would have little need to resort to a cause of action that requires
them to label themselves prostitutes. 37
2. Minnesota
In its initial form, the Minnesota legislation would have overcome
the weaknesses of the Florida statute by completely precluding many
typical defenses.1 38 The proposed language for the Minnesota statute,
like the Florida law, did not prohibit the continuing practice de-
fense. 139 But it did exclude other important defenses such as consent,
133. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 896-98. The report addressed the societal mis-
perceptions about prostitution:
Prostitutes are the victims of coercion and all who become prostitutes are coerced.
While some forms of coercion may not appear as such, the coercion clearly is revealed
when prostitution is stripped of its apologetic mythology .... The societal myth that
women choose a life of prostitution rests upon the premise that choice is possible and
that an affirmative decision is made. This firmly entrenched belief allows society to
blame the prostitute for the abusive treatment that inevitably comes from the life "they
have chosen." But the realities are different....
... [S]ociety does not understand, or acknowledge, the process of coercion that un-
derlies prostitution ....
Id. at 896-97.
134. Id. at 896-98.
135. Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "[c]ompulsion by physical force or threat
of physical force" and "[c]onduct that constitutes the improper use of economic power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 275 (8th ed.
2004).
136. Balas, 703 So. 2d at 1080 (Harris, J., concurring).
137. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 44.
138. Id. at 50-51.
139. MirN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.82 (West 2003).
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plaintiff initiation, and employer prohibition. 140 Minnesota legisla-
tors, however, feared that even innocent defendants would be hurt by
such an extensive list of nondefenses. 14 1 As a result, the legislature
proposed an amendment to change the statutory language from "[i]t is
not a defense" 142 to "none of the following shall alone or jointly be a
sufficient defense. ' 143 To the dismay of those who drafted and lobbied
for the Minnesota bill, the enacted statute included this amend-
ment.1 44 The statute permits defendants to plead the enumerated
nondefenses, so long as they are used in combination with a defense
not enumerated in the statute. 145 This is obviously less plaintiff-
friendly than the original draft of the statute:
Given society's current misconceptions about prostitution. . . a jury
might be convinced that no coercion occurred. This prediction is
likely ... after a jury hears testimony that the plaintiff consented to
engage in acts of prostitution, or engaged in prostitution, although
ostensibly prohibited from engaging in prostitution as a condition of
her employment, or that she made no attempt to flee. Juries will be
instructed that such testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to es-
tablish a defense. However, such testimony will undoubtedly bol-
ster an otherwise weak defense. Such testimony may also sway a
jury in favor of the defendant if the deciding factor is credibility of
the parties to the action, one of whom is a self-identified prostituted
woman.
146
For example, a john who introduces evidence that the plaintiff en-
gaged in prostitution even after his "date" with her would also be able
to introduce evidence that she propositioned him, consented to sexual
acts in exchange for money, or made no attempt to terminate contact
with the defendant-even though these defenses, standing alone,
would not absolve him.147 Faced with such evidence, a plaintiff is not
likely to succeed. 148 Although the Minnesota statute still includes
more nondefenses than the Florida law, the ability of defendants to
testify about them may undercut a plaintiff's ability to meet her bur-
den of proof. 149
140. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 50.
141. Id. at 50-51.
142. Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 52-53.
145. Id. at 53.
146. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 53.
147. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.82 (West 2003).
148. See Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 53.
149. See id.
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3. Hawaii
Despite being passed after the Florida and Minnesota laws, Ha-
waii's statute is the weakest of the three because it does not bar any
defenses.150 Accordingly, the statute places no restraint on the ability
of Hawaii courts to base decisions on traditional, stereotypical views
of prostitution and prostituted women. The failure to enumerate
inadmissible defenses increases the plaintiff's burden of proving coer-
cion. A defendant could counter evidence of coercion by arguing that
the plaintiff was a prostitute prior to the alleged coercion, that she
consented to the prostitution and received remuneration for the pros-
titution, or that she made little or no attempt to escape. 151 This in-
creased burden in proving coercion will be nearly insurmountable for
plaintiffs, except for those who were compelled to perform each and
every sexual act by outright physical force or threats of violence. 152 In
such cases, the defendant would probably be subject to civil liability
for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as
well as criminal liability for felonious sexual assault. It is unclear why
anyone would resort to the Hawaii statute given the tendency of soci-
ety to view prostituted women as complicit rather than as victims. 153
A traditional action in tort would probably be the preferred legal
recourse.
4. Illinois
The list of nondefenses in the final version of the PAA 154 was pared
down from a much more extensive list included in the version origi-
nally passed by the Illinois House. 155 Despite the changes, the Act is
150. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663J (LexisNexis 2002).
151. Id. § 633J-4.
152. The pool of plaintiffs in Hawaii would necessarily be limited to this group for several
reasons. Most women go through a number of pimps before escaping prostitution; without
"prior prostitution" delineated as a nondefense, these women could sue only their first pimp.
Since consent is not delineated as a nondefense, a Hawaii defendant is not barred from arguing
that a plaintiff "consented" to negate the element of coercion, which is statutorily defined as a
"means to use or threaten to use any form of domination, restraint, or control." Id. § 663J-2.
And because the very definition of prostitution requires that the individuals involved receive
money in exchange for their "services," remuneration would be a defense for almost every case.
Id. § 712-1200.
153. FLORIDA REPORT, supra note 28, at 896-97.
154. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/25 (West Supp. 2007); see also supra notes 92-93.
155. H.B. 1299, 94th Gen. Assem. § 25 (I11. 2005). Several nondefenses were taken out of the
bill before its final version:
[T]he plaintiff owed a debt to the defendant, monetary or otherwise; ... the plaintiff
initiated involvement with the defendant; ... the plaintiff continued to engage in sex
trade activity after terminating contact with defendant; ... as a condition of employ-
ment, the defendant required the plaintiff to agree not to engage in the sex trade; [and]
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more likely to be useful for plaintiffs than the Florida, Hawaii, or Min-
nesota statutes, because it completely bars consent as a defense in
every case. 156 The defense of consent is unequivocally admissible
under the Hawaii statute and is likely to be admissible in Florida,
given that the statutory language does not enumerate consent as a
nondefense. 57 Similarly, the Minnesota statute bars consent and
other enumerated nondefenses only when used alone or in combina-
tion with other inadmissible defenses. 158
One weakness of the PAA is that it does not bar defendant employ-
ers from asserting the employer prohibition defense. 159 This is an im-
portant difference from the Minnesota statute. Although it may not
decrease the number of suits initiated against indoor prostitution es-
tablishments, it is likely to decrease plaintiffs' chances of recovering
against them. Allowing businesses to use this defense ignores the re-
ality that many seemingly legitimate dance and strip clubs encourage
backroom prostitution tacitly, after hiring girls and women as "danc-
ers" and papering the facilities with the official "house rules.' 160
The PAA also fails to bar the continuing practice defense.161 This
makes the statute internally inconsistent to a degree, because the
point of this defense is to convince the factfinder that the plaintiff
participated in the act of her own free will. This amounts to consent,
which is statutorily prohibited as a defense, and it also seems irrele-
vant given that the statute does not require coercion.1 62 A plaintiff's
continued involvement in prostitution merely demonstrates that the
plaintiff continued to be involved in an industry that is "inherently
coercive, abusive, and exploitive."'1 63 Of course, nothing in the statute
... the defendant's place of business was posted with signs prohibiting illegal sex trade
activity.
Id.
156. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/25(6). The Illinois statute would even ensure that plain-
tiffs cannot contract away their ability to sue: "No person may avoid liability under this Act by
means of any conveyance of any right, title, or interest in real property, or by any indemnifica-
tion, hold harmless agreement, or similar agreement that purports to show consent of the victim
of the sex trade." Id. § 128/45.
157. See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 139-149 and accompanying text.
159. These provisions did appear in an earlier version of the bill. H.B. 1299, at § 25(12)-(13).
160. See RAPHAEL, supra note 2, 52-73 (discussing one woman's entry into prostitution via a
strip club and the prevalence of prostitution activities in such clubs).
161. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 128/25. The Illinois statute prohibits defendants from using
plaintiffs' prior prostitution as a defense. The version of the bill passed by the Illinois House in
2005 would have prohibited defenses that used plaintiffs' prostitution activities both before and
after involvement with the defendants.
162. Id.
163. Transcription Deb., 33rd Legis. Day, 94th Gen. Assem. 31 (111. 2005) (statement of Rep.
Howard).
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states that Illinois courts must allow such a defense, and it is possible
that testimony and evidence contributing to such a defense would be
excluded on relevance grounds.
D. Statutes of Limitations
Florida and Minnesota have longer statutes of limitations than Ha-
waii, but their limitation periods are still several years shorter than in
Illinois, even in cases where the plaintiff was a minor at the time of
injury. Suits brought under the Florida law are governed by the stat-
ute of limitations applicable to traditional personal injury actions in
tort.164 These suits must be filed within four years, except where the
injured party was a minor at the time of the injury and the injury con-
stitutes "abuse" under Florida law.165 In such instances, the statute
runs at the latest of seven years after the plaintiff's eighteenth birth-
day, four years after becoming independent of the defendant, or four
years after the date the injured party realizes she has been harmed
and understands that the defendant caused the injury.166
The promoters of the Minnesota bill proposed an intricate statute of
limitations that would have "address[ed] the problems survivors of
prostitution experience" by allowing plaintiffs "to initiate legal action
within six years of the time they 'knew and fully understood' they had
been injured, and that the defendant was responsible for that in-
jury."'1 67 But the version enacted into law is much more limited.168 It
runs six years from the date the cause of action arises and is tolled
while the coercive behavior of the defendant continues. 169 The Min-
nesota law includes an exception for plaintiffs who were minors at the
time of injury. 170 In those cases, the statute of limitations does not run
until five years after the plaintiff turns eighteen. 171
Hawaii's law is the true outlier in terms of statutes of limitations, as
it requires that suits be brought within two years of "an act of promot-
ing prostitution by coercion by that person," and would be tolled only
"[d]uring the minority of the individual" or while an investigation or
164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(o) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006).
165. Id. § 95.11(7).
166. Id.
167. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 45, 47.
168. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.84. Had the Minnesota legislature not included this provision
at all, however, suits would have been governed by the two-year statute of limitations for most
torts in that state. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07 (West 2000).
169. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.84.
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.15.
171. Id.
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prosecution of the defendant is underway. 172 This limitations provi-
sion is unduly restrictive for a number of reasons, including the fact
that it accrues from the moment that the prospective plaintiff leaves
the control of the defendant. This makes filing suit more difficult for
prostituted individuals coerced by one individual after another, since
the statute is not tolled if the plaintiff continues to be coerced to re-
main in prostitution by someone other than the defendant. Unlike
Florida and Minnesota, Hawaii has no separate statute of limitations
for traditional suits in tort for child sexual abuse and, perhaps as a
consequence, provides no additional allowance for plaintiffs whose in-
juries would fall into that category. 173
The PAA's statute of limitations stands apart from the very restric-
tive period under Hawaii law and the longer periods provided in the
Florida and Minnesota statutes. The Illinois law allows individuals
who have been prostituted to file suit within ten years, similar to the
statute of limitations for tort suits in Illinois based on childhood sexual
abuse.174 That the limitations period surpasses the two years allowed
for traditional personal injury actions 175 reflects an understanding of
the obstacles that most prostituted individuals face in attempting to
bring a suit under the Act. Plaintiffs may not immediately understand
"the injuries suffered[,] . . . how the injuries were caused[,] and who
was responsible for their infliction," may not be able to determine the
real names and locations of potential defendants, may suffer from
prostitution-related injuries, and may be subject to ongoing coercion
at the hands of others after the initial injury. 176 These difficulties in-
crease the amount of time that a prospective plaintiff needs to be able
to sue successfully. 177
The PAA's statute of limitations is also beneficial in that it is tolled
while the plaintiff is a minor or has some other legal disability, while
the plaintiff is subjected to a "continuing series of sex trade acts by the
172. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663J-7 (LexisNexis 2002).
173. Personal injury suits in Hawaii, including suits for child sexual abuse, must be filed within
two years, tolled only during insanity, minority, or imprisonment. id. § 657-7.
174. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2 (West 2003). The previous version of the PAA did
not limit the time individuals in prostitution have to file suits for declaratory judgment or injunc-
tive relief. H.B. 1299, 94th Gen. Assem. § 35(e) (Ill. 2005). The exclusion of that provision will
probably not reduce the number of suits brought under this law, because bringing such suits
would be as emotionally traumatizing as other suits under this bill and involve the same difficul-
ties in locating a proper defendant, but with the added problem of raising the money for an
attorney and court costs.
175. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.
176. Giobbe & Gibel, supra note 74, at 47.
177. See id. at 46-48 (discussing similar obstacles to suits based on childhood sexual abuse and
prostitution-related injuries).
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same defendant," while the plaintiff is subject to "threats, intimida-
tion, manipulation, or fraud perpetrated by the defendant or by any
person acting in the interest of the defendant," and during the length
of limitations periods for criminal laws under which the plaintiff may
be prosecuted.178 These provisions should increase plaintiffs' chances
of success in suits against pimps or businesses that acted as pimps, but
are unlikely to affect the success of suits against johns. As previously
discussed, a central barrier to suits against johns will be identifying
and locating them, possibly many years after a single interaction. The
version of the bill first passed by the Illinois House would have tolled
the statute of limitations while the plaintiff remained unable to iden-
tify or locate the prospective defendant despite reasonable efforts.179
The absence of this provision in the enacted law is probably of little
consequence, however, as the ten-year limitations period does much
of the same work.
IV. IMPACT
This Part examines the likely impact of the PAA and compares its
usefulness with criminal prosecution in Illinois. It argues that the
PAA, although making a statement that prostituted women are vic-
tims in some sense, should not be seen as a remedy for the chronic
underenforcement of prostitution laws against pimps and johns.
A. The Few Cases Brought Under the PAA Are
Likely to End in Settlement
Despite the efforts of the PAA's drafters to meet the challenges that
prostituted women face in pursuing justice, the statute is unlikely to
be frequently invoked in Illinois courts because of the inherent diffi-
culties in bringing these types of suits.180 Although there are
thousands of prostituted women in the Chicago area alone who argua-
bly have a claim under the PAA, few of them are likely to be in a
position to take advantage of the statute.181 Individuals trapped in the
world of prostitution may not realize that they have a cause of action,
and even if they hear of the law, they may not have the funds to hire a
178. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-225.
179. H.B. 1299.,94th Gen. Assem. § 35 (II1. 2005).
180. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
181. JODY RAPHAEL & DEBORAH L. SHAPIRO, SISTERS SPEAK OUT: THE LIVES AND NEEDS
OF PROSTITUTED WOMEN IN CHICAGO: A RESEARCH STUDY 8 (2002), available at http://www.
impactresearch.org/documents/sistersspeakout.pdf (reporting on a 2000 study by the Center for
Impact Research that estimated that at least 16,000 women and girls are involved in prostitution
regularly in the Chicago area).
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lawyer. 182 Some of these difficulties could be alleviated by the assis-
tance of social service agencies, but those most in need of help are the
women who have not taken advantage of the services these agencies
offer.' 8 3 Of course, if social service agencies successfully brought even
a few cases, it may increase public knowledge about the true condition
of prostituted women and perhaps dissuade some would-be johns.
But this would do little for women now trapped in prostitution. For
these reasons, women who have already escaped the sex trade indus-
try are the most likely beneficiaries of the law, since they are in a
better position to learn about the existence of the law and to retain
attorneys. But regardless of whether they have left the prostitution
industry, many women would be reluctant to publicly label themselves
"prostitutes" and place themselves at the mercy of a judicial system
that has failed them countless times in the past. 184
B. Civil Causes of Action Under the Predator Accountability Act
vs. Criminal Prosecution of Pimps and Johns
Criminal law aims to protect the interests of the general public by
punishing those who cause harm or create situations from which
harmful consequences are likely to result. 185 Civil law and the law of
torts, on the other hand, focus on those who are injured by the con-
duct of others and, unlike criminal law, attempt to compensate injured
parties for their injuries.186 Within this framework, criminal prosecu-
tions of pimps and johns focus on these crimes as departures from
"what society regards as desirable," while civil causes of action against
pimps and johns emphasize the injury done to prostituted women and
provide a mechanism for them to recover for their injuries. 187 The
PAA embodies this important distinction between criminal law and
tort law and declares that prostitution is not a victimless crime, that
coercion is inherent in all acts of prostitution, and that prostitution has
life-long traumatizing consequences. While it is significant that Illi-
182. Although the law allows for recovery of attorney's fees and court costs, hiring an attor-
ney may prove cost-prohibitive, unless the plaintiff is so likely to prevail that an attorney is
willing to work on a contingent fee basis.
183. See RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 211-17 (discussing the social services currently available
for prostituted women and the lack of funding available for these services).
184. See CHI. COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, UNLOCKING OPTIONS FOR WOMEN, supra note
18 (discussing a study that suggested prostituted women who have been arrested are frequently
homeless or nearly homeless, suffer from a greater amount of violence, substance abuse, and
trauma than other women in the jail, and leave jail with little or no resources for addressing
these problems).
185. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3(b) (4th ed. 2003).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 1.5.
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nois has made this declaration, it somewhat contradicts the continued
existence of statutes criminalizing the sale of sex (as opposed to the
purchase of sex) and the ongoing inequitable enforcement of prostitu-
tion-related laws against women when compared to their
customers.188
In addition to the theoretical differences in targeting pimps and
johns in criminal versus civil proceedings, there are a number of fun-
damental procedural differences that may affect the respective out-
comes. Most obviously, the financial burdens and benefits of civil
suits are foreign to criminal prosecution.18 9 While victims of crime are
not required to have sufficient capital to initiate a suit, they also do
not recover damages or costs for a successful prosecution. 190 This dif-
ference between criminal and civil suits cuts both ways, but there are
other factors that make criminal prosecution less favorable than a civil
suit. First, criminal prosecution carries an evidentiary disadvantage
compared to civil actions, because the state must prove its case be-
yond a reasonable doubt, a more stringent standard than the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard of civil cases. In addition, the ability
of criminal defendants to exercise their Fifth Amendment right not to
testify' 91 compounds the evidentiary advantage of civil litigation.
Third, the statute of limitations for criminal suits against men who
have solicited or purchased sex in Illinois is just three years-less than
a third as long as provided for by the PAA.192
Despite the inherent procedural disadvantages, criminal prosecu-
tion of pimps and johns has one significant advantage over civil litiga-
tion: there is no confidential settlement. 93 Making pimps and johns
more visible to the public is crucial to improving the public under-
standing of prostitution. Many stereotypes associated with prostitu-
tion stem from the disproportionate arrest and prosecution of
188. Email from Jody Raphael, supra note 25; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2004: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 297 tbl.42 (2004), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/CIUS2004.pdf (showing that 69.1% of reported prosti-
tution-related arrests in 2004 were arrests of females).
189. Because "the purpose of criminal law is the suppression of crime and the punishment of
criminals" and "[ciriminal prosecutions are not brought for the protection and benefit of the
victim," the victim is not responsible for initiating the suit and does not tangibly benefit if the
prosecution is successful. LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 6.5(b), at 363.
190. Id. Of course, in the case of criminal demand-side prostitution laws, society is considered
the victim, rather than the prostituted woman.
191. Id. § 3.5(e).
192. JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES
§ 19.58 (3d ed. 2000).
193. But see LAFAVE, supra note 185, § 6.5(d), (e) (discussing other reasons that criminal suits
sometimes fail to result in trial or conviction).
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prostituted women compared to johns and pimps, 194 and the single
best way to correct this injustice is to hold the men who fuel the sex
trade industry accountable, in a public way, through the criminal jus-
tice system. Moreover, strict enforcement of criminal laws against
soliciting and purchasing sex deters the men who have been prose-
cuted and seems likely to discourage others who have not. 95 "Suc-
cessful" civil suits under the PAA and similar statutes, on the other
hand, are much more likely to end in settlement, 96 reducing the po-
tential to educate the public or act as a deterrent.
V. CONCLUSION
The PAA is an important step toward official recognition of the
damage caused to women used in the sex trade. After years of under-
enforcing criminal laws against those who buy and sell women, the
Act contributes to a growing consensus that pimps, johns, and pander-
ers must be held accountable for their actions. Procedurally, a civil
cause of action is useful for prostituted individuals, who are not even
considered victims under the criminal law, because it gives them a
measure of control over the litigation process and allows them to re-
cover damages. Even though the PAA is perhaps the "most per-
fect"' 97 civil cause of action for prostituted women, it is only useful to
those who have already escaped the sex trade. 198 Further, the public
awareness created by suits brought under the Act will be less than
what would be accomplished through increased enforcement of prosti-
tution laws against johns and pimps, given the ability of civil defend-
ants to settle suits confidentially. 199 For these reasons, advocates for
prostituted women must pursue decriminalization of the sale of sex
and press for strict enforcement of existing criminal laws against the
men who keep the business of prostitution going.200 Reducing the use
of women and girls in prostitution requires fair and regular enforce-
ment of criminal laws against buying sex and pimping. Until then,
194. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2004, supra note
188.
195. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 218-19.
196. Baldwin, supra note 68, at 110 (stating that all other cases brought under the Florida
statute "resulted in significant financial settlements in favor of the claimants").
197. Email from Jody Raphael, supra note 25.
198. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
200. Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Keynote Address: Demand and the Debate, in DEMAND DYNAM-
ics, supra note 29, at 1 (emphasizing the need to focus attention on the demand-side of the
prostitution industry and highlighting the experiences in European countries with total
decriminalization versus decriminalization of the demand side alone).
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women like Olivia will be forced to rely on rare and uncertain tools
like the PAA to pursue what small measure of justice is available.
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